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Becoming “Dalit” is the process through which the caste 
subaltern enters into circuits of political commensuration and 
into the value regime of “the human.” (Rao 2009, 264).  
 
 
In this article I reflect on Gramsci‟s category of the “subaltern”, taking into 
consideration recent contributions to this topic, particularly those offered by Joseph 
Buttigieg, Giorgio Baratta and Marcus Green. The latter, besides presenting an 
eloquent critique of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak‟s article Can the Subaltern Speak?, 
allows me to return to Gramscian sources so as to carry out a radicalisation of 
Gramsci‟s positions with reference to the experience of “Untouchables”/Dalits  in 
South Asia. There is little doubt that the enquiry into the “Subaltern Question” in 
India today cannot ignore the “Dalit Question” as “the political unconscious of Indian 
society” (Rao 2009, xiii). The case study referring to the Rishi-Dalits of Bangladesh 
accentuates still further the precarious position of these groups as subalterns, but also 
their aspiration to overcome subalternity.  
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1. Gramsci and the Subaltern: Methodology and Historiography. 
Green‟s systematic analysis of the concept of the “subaltern” underlines abuses and 
misconceptions of this category in the Anglophone world, showing that the passage 
of the term from a literal to a figurative usage is already evident by the end of 
Notebook 1 (Green 2002, 2). Having made several comments in the Notebooks 
regarding the subalterns, in 1934 Gramsci embarked on writing Notebook 25, where  
- under the title “On the Margins of History (The History of Subaltern Social 
Groups)” – he copied, transcribed and developed the notes of Notebooks 1 and 3. 
Besides not concluding his project, Gramsci found himself in a position of 
“subalternity” which gives his notes an often indicative and fragmentary perspective, 
though containing relevant intuitions. Significantly Green points to the need to 
interpret this concept as “... interwoven with his political, social, intellectual, literary, 
cultural, philosophical, religious, and economic analyses” (Green 2002, 3).  We 
might say that Gramsci was interested in developing a multidisciplinary approach to 
the study of subalterns.  
Within this methodology, we need to take into account the development of the 
Gramscian concept of the sovereign state as “the protagonist of history” in relation to 
the “integral State” where both political and civil society intervene to preserve power 
for dominant groups through the hegemony of consent and coercion. There is a 
remarkable closeness between the two expressions “State as Protagonist of History” 
and the definition of subaltern groups as being “On the Margins of History,” 
including slaves, peasants, religious groups, women, different races and the 
proletariat. It is clear that Gramsci has in mind “subaltern groups” both in Italy and in 
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Europe, where a process of colonization was already taking place even prior to the 
development of a territorial colonialism outside Europe.  
Despite Gramsci‟s interest in proposing a theory für ewig and formulating general 
theories and conclusions, his methodology is based on “particular events, pieces of 
information, and observations” (Green 2002, 8; Buttigieg 1992, 48), in order  “to 
„translate‟ the elements of historical life into theoretical language” (Q 3 § 48). In 
summary, writes Green “He wants to understand how the conditions and relations of 
the past influence the present and future development of the subaltern‟s lived 
experience” (Green 2002, 8). 
I return below to the “subaltern‟s lived experience”, since this affects what Gramsci 
calls their “common sense”, their understanding of reality or, their “philosophy”. In 
order to accomplish a translation into theoretical language, and to understand these 
“conditions and relations of the past”, Gramsci appeals to “integral history” as a 
versatile workshop which takes into account political, socio-economic, cultural and 
religious dynamics, in which the “integral historian” is able to perceive “the totality 
and complexity of the historical process, from the tendencies of the economic 
structure to the forms of popular culture that shape . . . the consciousness of the 
masses (Morera 1990, 61; in Green 2002, 9).”  
In Notebook 3 § 90 Gramsci offers a methodological process divided into six 
progressive phases which should be further developed to include intermediate phases, 
so that, as he specifies in Notebook 25§ 5 , “The [integral] historian must record, and 
discover the causes of, the line of development towards integral autonomy, starting 
from the most primitive phases.” It is noteworthy that in the transition from Q 3 to Q 
25, already at a methodological level and perhaps intentionally, Gramsci  uses the 
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expressions “subaltern classes” and “subaltern groups” interchangeably (Green 2002, 
9).  
In order to prove the Gramscian thesis on phases of development, Green refers to 
other passages in the Notebooks  where Gramsci discusses Manzoni‟s position in 
relation to subalterns, who “ „have no history‟: [that is to say] there are no traces of 
their history in the historical documents of the past” (Q 14, §39). This example points 
towards the famous note of Q 3 where Gramsci analyses the “element of spontaneity” 
as “characteristic of subaltern classes.” Theirs is a history considered so marginal and 
peripheral that they “have not attained a consciousness of the class per se and ... 
consequently do not even suspect that their history might possibly have any 
importance or that it might be of any value to leave documentary evidence of it” (Q 3 
§ 48).  Those who have conducted research among Dalits have experienced the 
difficulty of proving the researcher‟s  genuine  interest in their history and their life. 
While Dalit scholars might question the validity of „outsiders‟ producing insightful 
accounts on Dalits, serious scholarship remains sensitive to this problematic issue 
(Rao 2009).   
Nevertheless, I advocate a historiography of a more recent kind, with reference to 
Michel de Certeau, who seems to validate Gramsci‟s thesis in relation to the 
methodological criteria used by Gramsci to retrace even those minimal signs of 
initiative found amongst subaltern groups, despite the fact  that their history is 
“necessarily fragmented and episodic” (Q 3 § 14). In his famous note of Q 25 § 2, 
Gramsci writes:  
Every trace of independent initiative on the part of subaltern groups should 
… be of incalculable value for the integral historian. Consequently, this kind 
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of history can only be dealt with monographically, and each monograph 
requires an immense quantity of material which is often hard to collect. 
 
Certeau explains the production of historiography as “operation” and “fabrication” of 
texts by the “circles of writing” and “institutions of power” which transform findings 
through the “practice of interpretation” into a “science”, thus preserving the authority 
of official history and achieving a kind of hegemony. According to Certeau, this is 
History with a capital „H‟, since all others are “small histories”, in lower case. Yet 
“official History” – although a fabrication – contains “traces” that the hegemonic 
historiography is unable to eliminate, thus preserving  traces of “small histories” if 
only to contradict them. Certeau returns continuously to the idea of “traces as 
inassimilable fragments of alterity” which spring up time and again “to importune” 
the interpretative apparatus of centres and institutions of learning and knowledge 
(Certeau 1988).  
These traces reveal the tactics – as opposed to the “strategies” of power – used by 
groups which find themselves “at the margins of history” and which occupy “zones 
of silence” (Certeau 1988, 79): heretics, mystics, possessed, as Certeau defines them; 
people not dissimilar to the Lazzaretti personage examined by Gramsci (Green 2002, 
13; Hobsbawn 1965, 65-73).  Differently from the interpretation given by Italian 
“intellectuals” (Lombroso and Barzellotti) who presented “narrow, individual, 
pathologic, etc. explanations” (Q 3 § 12), Gramsci analyses the conditions and the 
historical processes that have determined subordination. He displays even more 
sarcasm when commenting on Manzoni‟s “caste attitude”, towards the so-called 
“humble classes.” “In the novel The Betrothed”, Gramsci writes, “there is not one 
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common person who is not teased or laughed at … They are depicted as wretched 
and narrow people with no inner life. Only the nobles have an inner life” (Q 23, § 
51). Gramsci cannot avoid noticing that the official interpretation of the subalterns 
offered by Italian intellectuals does not rest merely on a narrow definition but strikes 
at the very heart of their personhood as human beings, leaving them incapable of “an 
inner life.”  
As a conclusion to his analysis, Green summarises the Gramscian position thus: (1) it 
is possible to produce a history of the subalterns; (2) these groups evolve according to 
phases or degrees of political organisation; (3) the hegemonic context in which 
subalterns find themselves (the political, social, economic and cultural milieu) 
promotes and strives to maintain the situation of subalternity; and (4) despite these 
difficulties, subaltern groups are able to transform their social subordination (Green 
2002, 15). 
At this point, Green examines recent trends in publications by the Subaltern Studies 
collective, headed by Ranajit Guha, which taking inspiration from Gramsci, has 
disseminated the term “subaltern” internationally. In his analysis Green includes 
Spivak‟s article (1988) and prefaces his argument by maintaining that both Spivak‟s 
and Guha‟s reading of Gramsci is based almost exclusively on Selections from the 
Prison Notebooks (Gramsci 1971) and therefore offers a very restricted interpretation 
of the Gramscian concept of the “subaltern.” Yet whilst Guha‟s reference to Gramsci 
seems motivated by an acknowledgement of Gramsci‟s relevance to the Subaltern 
Studies project (Guha 2007), Spivak‟s intentions seem to be different, as I 
demonstrate below (Buttigieg 1998, 56).  
7 
 
The shortcomings of Guha‟s approach is emphasised also by Spivak, who defines as 
“essentialist and taxonomic” Guha‟s description of subalterns as “different from the 
elite”. According to Spivak, the discourse of Subaltern Studies is intrinsically flawed 
because it relies on British, nationalist and colonialist documents, in which subalterns 
leave minimal traces. If the representation of subalterns finds itself “inscribed” into 
the dominant discourse, Spivak concludes “the subaltern cannot speak.”  Clearly, this 
position dissociates itself from a Gramscian approach when referring to the search for 
“traces” offered by the subaltern.  
  
2. Can the Subaltern Speak? Not merely a rhetorical question.  
Taking into consideration Green‟s meticulous analysis, I want to propose a further 
reflection on Spivak‟s  question Can the Subaltern Speak? which “has gone around 
the world” (Baratta 2008) and never ceases to challenge our intellect.  
Spivak does not seem at all interested in deepening a reflection on the Gramscian 
discourse on the subaltern, as she herself has pointed out (Spivak 2004).
1
  Rather, 
Spivak underlines at various stages that her critique of both the occidental “desire” to 
problematise the subject and the way in which the “third-world” subject is 
represented in western discourse, finds pertinent and ample support in Marx and 
Derrida, thus making Gramsci – presumably – redundant. She maintains that the 
occidental intellectual production colludes with the international economic interests 
of the West, a position with which I am in complete agreement. What leaves me 
perplexed is not so much her proposal of an alternative analysis of relations between 
“Western discourses” and the possibility of “speaking of (or for) the subaltern 
woman” (Spivak 1988, 271), and not even so much her choice of case-study - the 
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abolition of the “widows‟ sacrifice” (sati) by the British in India - but more the 
process she adopts to reach this end.  
It seems clear that Spivak is not only interested in exposing the deficiencies of “the 
Western subject”, but she is also interested in taking an explicit position within the 
struggle for “intellectual supremacy” in the West. At a time when in the U.S. 
intellectual scene the alternative choices are between the poststructuralist positions of 
Foucault/Deleuze or Derrida, Spivak sides with the latter. Indeed, this is apparent 
when she states that her essay was written “whether in defence of Derrida or not” 
(291), or when she affirms that “this is not an apology” (292). The counterposition 
Foucault-Derrida is most noticeable at the beginning of part three of her article, 
where Spivak writes with perceptible dissent referring to the choice of  U.S. 
academics and students who prefer Foucault to Derrida  (Spivak 1988, 291).  This 
critique had already been raised in a previous, apparently harmless note: 
It is important to note that the greatest “influence” of Western European 
intellectuals upon U.S. professors and students happens through collections 
of essays rather than long books in translation. And, in those collections, it is 
understandably the most topical pieces that gain a great currency... (Spivak 
1988, 309).  
No objection can be raised to this argument, except that Spivak is accusing her North 
American colleagues of operating in the same way she has in relation to Gramsci. I 
confine myself here to the substantial acknowledgement by Spivak of the advantages 
of deconstruction as a methodology appropriate to resisting the assimilation of 
Alterity, as this happens in the imperialist formation of the colonial subject. In more 
specific terms, Spivak maintains that even efforts carried out by anthropology, 
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history, political science and sociology “will, in the long run, cohere with the work of 
imperialist subject constitution, mingling epistemic violence with the advancement of 
learning and civilization. And the subaltern woman will be as mute as ever” (1988, 
295).  
Perhaps we should deduce that, precisely because Derrida‟s text does not contain the 
word “woman”, the latter becomes an inaccessible absence and for that very reason 
inassimilable by Derrida‟s text and hence not exposed to logocentrism. This 
motivates Spivak‟s choice to propose for reflection the silence of a woman (her 
grandmother‟s sister) who, in 1926, hanged herself in her own father‟s house in 
Calcutta. Ten years after her death, it was discovered that Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri – 
this woman – was part of a group supporting independence and, unable to carry out a 
political assassination assigned to her, killed herself. For Spivak this suicide becomes 
“an unemphatic, ad hoc, subaltern rewriting of the social text of sati-suicide” (308), 
given that at the end “the subaltern as female cannot be heard or read.” (ibid.).2  
Spivak‟s critique, both against British imperialism, in its intent to carry out a 
civilizing mission, and against fanatical nationalism, is impeccable both from 
historical and literary perspectives. The analysis of texts leads Spivak to conclude 
that sati is the result of a “grammatical error”, thus stressing once again the 
impossibility of recovering the subaltern woman as a subject. In her very last 
paragraph, Spivak reiterates once more the supremacy of Derridian deconstruction – 
“which I do not celebrate as feminism as such” (308) – over the positions of Foucault 
and Deleuze.   
I fully concur with Spivak that Derrida‟s radical critique has had a decisive impact in 
exposing “the danger to appropriate the other by assimilation.” I also share her view 
that Derrida provides us with useful analytical tools with which to contest the violent 
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supremacy of the occidental Logos-subject. But I also maintain that Derrida is not the 
only theorist within western thought to question the subject and to motivate ethical 
responsibilities that resist the assimilation of the Other. I believe a return to 
Gramsci‟s thesis on subaltern groups is imperative to avoid mystifying traps: 
Gramscian theory, always directed towards praxis, is no less demanding.  
Without diminishing the value of Spivak‟s reading of events, we could perhaps put 
forward a more radical critique meant to contrast both western imperialism in India 
and the persistence of colonialism within postcolonial India. The original title of 
Spivak‟s article was “Power, Desire, Interest” and as such it awakens possible 
Gramscian reflections. There are, indeed, a few questions which need to be 
addressed. The first would be: why did the British feel the need to abolish the 
“widows‟ suicide” (sati) and, judging it an abhorrent tradition, try to justify their 
colonial enterprise as a “civilizing mission”? Why did the abolition of 
“Untouchability” not receive the same consideration by the colonizers? In a sense, 
Untouchability more than sati would seem to include western ideological imperialism 
connected with colonial economic exploitation, as Spivak rightly maintains.   
Whilst the practice of sati had been formally abolished in the Presidency of Bengal in 
1829, only as late as 1833 did the British Parliament approve the “Slavery Abolition 
Act.” In South Asia today, Dalits represent the quintessence of this reality, not only 
from an economic and social point of view, but also from an ontological perspective, 
touching the order of being and of human personhood.  Our main concern is that at 
the basis of their subalternity there lies an ideology defining them less-than-human, 
which is then translated and ramified in very concrete terms in the daily life of Dalits. 
For them  subalternity becomes a spatial/territorial, economical, social, educational 
and, above all, religious/ontological segregation. This is also the poignant and 
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powerful meaning of the word “Dalit”  – „„broken, downtrodden‟‟ . The adoption of 
the term Dalit as self-designation springs out of the awareness and perception of the 
oppression/humiliation (Guru 2009) they have to endure: the real subaltern in 
Gramscian terms. When the word Dalit is spoken by a non-Dalit it might have the 
character of a derogatory remark. Yet for Dalits themselves the term has become a 
place of resistance and a reason for struggle. 
The question thus returns -  making today an ever more urgent appeal - for the 
subaltern-Dalits of South Asia: “Can the subaltern speak?” If Derridian 
deconstruction of the occidental subject prevents us from hearing the cry of the 
subaltern, then Gramsci becomes indispensable in calling the Western subject to its 
ethical responsibilities, because this is an ethical question. If upholding the sati 
tradition can be ascribed to a grammatical error, then which grammatical error is it 
that allowed Untouchability to exist and persist in South Asia? If it is true that the 
Western subject has imposed an imperial domination through the “violence of 
episteme”, which episteme and what different epistemology validate the continuity of 
Untouchability? Besides the Manusmirti there is also the interpretation of these 
scriptures by the “centres of knowledge” and the creation of apparatuses – including 
mythologies (Zene 2007) – which further validate caste and Untouchability. We 
witness here the confluence of hegemony employed by civil society – in different 
ways within South Asia –  with hegemony exercised by the State (Buttigieg 1998, 59-
60) in a concurrence that preserves caste and Untouchability, notwithstanding the 
fluidity of these concepts and  their different construal from the pre-colonial through 
the postcolonial period.   
I do not stand in opposition to the feminist stance adopted by Spivak. My proposal is 
in fact to radicalise Spivak‟s position even further. If a young woman belonging to a 
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high-caste kills herself without explanation and that gesture is interpreted as the 
“silence of the subaltern”, my reply is that Dalit women are doubly subaltern, both as 
women and as Dalit. Not only does the Dalit woman speak and talk, but she wants to 
be listened to through words, poetry, singing, dancing and working -  and more 
precisely the always underpaid extra-work. Often the Dalit woman finds herself 
compelled to subtract a handful of rice from the family dinner, sell that rice and pay 
for her daughter‟s education, so that the latter will not like her, be illiterate, but will 
learn to defend herself from within and outside the group (Zene 2002). Besides 
inspiring a different understanding of „dalitness‟ within their own communities, Dalit 
women have also motivated feminist scholarship  to challenge  Brahmanical 
feminism (Rao ed. 2003; Tharu 2003; Rege 2004, 2006;  Narayan 2006), to address 
anew the „Caste Question‟ (Rao 2009) and to postulate the Dalit as a “new political 
subject” (Rao 2008).   There are thus many reasons – around 200 million reasons in 
fact, equal to the number of Dalits in South Asia – that compel me to radicalize our 
reflection, in this sense Gramscian, on the subaltern. 
 
3. “Learning to learn from the Subaltern” 
In more recent interventions (Spivak 1990, 1993, 1999, 2000),
 
especially a key-note 
address delivered at the UCSB (Spivak 2004), Spivak reaffirms some key-concepts 
when, for instance, she says: “No one can say „I am a subaltern‟ in whatever 
language.” She reiterates well-known positions, such as her dedication to theoretical 
study, asserting clearly that she is not a political activist, and that she proposes to 
recuperate the role of abstraction when upholding concepts such as the State and 
secularism.   
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In her UCSB communication,  Spivak maintains that the “old subaltern” is replaced 
by a “new subaltern”, asserting that she “read Gramsci separately.” This “new 
subaltern”, however, highlights Spivak‟s own trajectory:  by way of her commitment 
(“my fieldwork”) during the past 15-20 years promoting education among Tribal 
groups (Adivasis) in North Bengal, Spivak has discovered multiple levels of 
subalternity. The “new subaltern” appears to her as “very permeable” and thus 
exposed to the risk of being not only represented, but also exploited by the global 
market. Through this, Spivak has reached a conclusion that leads her to a pedagogic 
philosophy: “learn from the subaltern”, and more precisely “learn to learn from 
below.”  
For this to happen we must acknowledge that subalterns are in fact able and allowed 
not only to speak and to talk but also “to teach”. She makes references, for instance to 
the pertinent „logic‟ used by Adivasis, insisting that  “... logic is not the property of 
Europe”. Once again, I believe that Derrida is not alone in highlighting the 
problematic character of the occidental subject and that a deconstructivist position 
leaves us insolvent until a manifest ethical stance intervenes to urge the western 
subject  to become accountable and responsible. Spivak‟s intention of “learning how 
to learn from the subaltern”, can be put into practice when this ethical subject is ready  
“to learn how to listen to, in order to learn from the subaltern.” This pedagogy seems 
eminently Gramscian to me, in that it looks at “integral history” as an “integral 
historian”, ready to listen and to search for those “traces” that will allow us to 
recognize elements of resistance. 
In her speech at Santa Barbara, Spivak hints at personal details - she belongs to the 
Bengali middle-class, she is an “old socialist”,  a non-believer and so does not 
consider herself Hindu - all reasonable standpoints and irreproachable personal 
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choices.  However, when these choices are pushed to the extreme, they prevent 
Spivak from seeing reality through the eyes of the integral historian. The fact that she 
does not consider herself Hindu, does not mean that a great part of the hegemonic 
Indian civil society has renounced considering itself Hindu. In renouncing to be a 
Hindu, Spivak does not seem to feel the need to discuss in depth the presence in India 
of the caste system, as a direct consequence of Hinduism at a social level. Once 
again, this does not acknowledge that for many the caste system constitutes a most 
„painful‟ reality. As a consequence, she prefers to talk, even in Marxist terms, of 
social class. However, given this premise, I think that one cannot avoid taking caste 
into consideration, even when one proposes a discourse on class consciousness. It 
appears impossible not to perceive that this hegemonic religious ideology justifies an 
apparently immutable stratification of society, hence providing a validation for the 
presence of subaltern groups within the caste system. Moreover, we need to move 
“beyond caste” in order to identify those human groups who are not even considered 
worthy to belong to the castes and are thus defined as “Outcastes”, and hence 
“Untouchables.” 3 This is so because some religious-legal texts deem them to be 
permanently “impure” (asuci), as defined by those who regard themselves as “pure” 
and want to remain so.  
If, on the one hand, the choice of  those who do not share a caste ideology  seems 
commendable, on the other, given that they disregard this ideology,  it represents a 
blind choice from the point of view of “integral history”, given that castes do not 
disappear simply by being ignored, and that the subjugation of Dalits and others still 
persists. The latter, for instance, lament that when they adhere to left-wing 
movements and parties, they are still treated as Untouchables by leaders and 
“intellectuals” who belong to high castes (Bandyopadhyay 2008).4  
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Returning to Spivak, but also to Gramsci, I would like to point out: (1) If we wish to 
propose for South Asia a prototype of subaltern who embodies those characteristics 
expressed by Gramsci, we cannot but think of the Dalits or, more precisely, of Dalit 
women. (2) The categories used by Spivak to identify the “new subaltern” clearly 
point back – in addition to a different comprehension of this reality by Spivak – to the 
phases proposed by Gramsci for subalterns. The diverse groups of Dalits in South 
Asia reflect this Gramscian classification of phases of subalternity, precisely because 
they are compelled to progress from the lowest possible level of non-humanity. (3) 
Gramscian terminology, which contemplates not just “subaltern classes” but also 
“subaltern groups,” allows us to open up to different circumstances and scenarios, 
such as those present in South Asia. (4) In their history these Dalit groups manifest 
moments and “traces” of self-consciousness of their subaltern condition and they 
offer palpable examples of resistance and a willingness to overcome subalternity – at 
different levels and to varying degrees – despite the persistence of “disaggregation, 
multiplicity and juxtaposition”.5 (5) Gramsci invites us to consider “integral history” 
as an effective methodology employed to discover those “traces” present in the 
history of Dalits. It is a history that takes into account how Dalits express themselves, 
in order to manifest and overcome their subalternity through their own means and 
their meta-language: folklore, popular religiosity, so-called “superstitions”, tales and 
myths, proverbs, music, dance, theatre, figurative arts, or what Boninelli (2007) calls 
“indigestible fragments” or, more poetically, “Gramscian paths.”  
No one can be prevented from choosing and defending secularism or agnosticism, as 
the affirmation of a humanism free from “absolute” ideologies. But we cannot avoid 
asking ourselves why for subalterns, in this case for Dalits,  religion represents an 
important reality, expressed through both their adherence to various reformist 
16 
 
movements within Hinduism (Bhakti, Vaisnava, Sanskritisation) or their conversion 
to other religions such as Islam, Buddhism and Christianity (Zelliot 2004). Even prior 
to judging whether their commitment to these movements and religions has 
effectively resolved their condition of subalternity, we must question the reasons 
behind their choices and seek to understand their ultimate motivations (Díaz-Salazar 
1991).  
In a socio-historical context that defines human beings in terms of their ability to 
relate to and get closer to the divine, it seems obvious that for those who are 
excluded, ostracised and effectively denied this choice, there remains no alternative 
but to demonstrate their ability to achieve proximity to the divine, if only in a 
polemical manner. If “religious language” is reserved by hegemonic powers to 
maintain the subaltern‟s subjugation, then it seems logical – even when different 
from Western logics and epistemology – that subalterns use this very language to re-
affirm themselves and their human dignity.
6
 In other words, if to possess Dharma – 
which we commonly translate as “religion,” but which also implies law, moral code, 
and duty – means to be human and hence capable of practising dharmikota 
(religiosity/religiousness) and of taking upon oneself the range of implied 
responsibilities, then it is evident that Dalits, deprived of the possibility of achieving 
Dharma,   will do everything in their power to prove and assert their dharmikota. If 
this is what is asked of me in order to attest to my “being a person,” then I will 
consider all possible mechanisms and will use every means to attain this. I have no 
alternative but to use the existing language-code also as a meta-language in order to 
“announce” (to speak and to talk)  that I too am human. And there is nothing more 
“Gramscian” than this. Following Eleanor  Zelliot‟s lead, recent scholarship in India 
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has emphasized the socio-religious and cultural dimensions present in  the Dalit-
subaltern experience (Bhagavan and Feldhaus 2008a, 2008b; Zelliot 1996, 2004).   
 
4. “We too are Humans” (Amrao je manus).  
The question of “humanity” seems to be at the core, even in Gramscian terms, when 
summing up all other concerns that affect the life of Dalits. This is the issue taken up 
by Baratta in his reflection on the subaltern when he asks, “what is a human being?” 
thus combining the Gramscian enquiry with a Heideggerian slant on the “sense of 
being” (Baratta 2004, 128). If Dalits in South Asia experience a negation of their 
being as “humans” - not just as a social practice but from an ontological perspective 
(“the ontological hurt endured by untouchables” – Gheeta 2009, 107) - then we must 
conclude they have been placed at the lowest degree of subalternity. Furthermore if, 
once they have reached the far end of “non-being”, they continue to tell us “I am a 
human being, too!”, then it becomes a duty for the integral historian to retrace their 
journey – perhaps together with them – so as to discover those “traces of resistance” 
that their history offers.  
I share Spivak‟s pedagogical philosophy according to which we need to “learn how 
to learn” from the subaltern, a philosophy I find most Gramscian: learning how to be 
taught and how to understand, hence to experience how to merge theory with 
practice, to then return to “my initial theory” in order to purify it from the many 
trivialities that are burdensome, so as to make it more human and humanising. I share 
this position also because I have experienced it myself, while conducting research in 
Bangladesh among the Rishi, ex-Untouchables and Dalits.
7
 In my historical-
anthropological research, I contacted various Rishi groups distributed in the south-
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west region of Khulna. Some of these groups have, since 1856, converted to 
Christianity. My research took me also among those who had not converted and were 
“affiliated” with Hinduism. One evening during 1989 while in Chuknagar, a 
missionary who had resided with the Rishi for several years organised a meeting so I 
could interview their headmen. After exchanging views on the general situation of 
the group, our conversation turned to the issue of “conversion”, since the missionary 
had not wanted to “accept” them into Christianity. According to the missionary, they 
were not yet ready. The headmen insisted, but all their remarks received equally 
“logical” replies from the missionary. After a long pause, the eldest among them got 
up and before leaving said to the missionary: “Remember, Father, we too are human 
beings” (Amrao je manus – Zene 2000). Those words have never left me  and still 
motivate my present research. The elder headman was teaching us to understand his 
experience as Untouchable-Subaltern and to recognise his desire to define himself 
differently from the way others identified him.  
During my stay among the Rishi, I came to verify how those words translated into a 
common praxis within the group, a praxis “necessarily fragmented and episodic” 
(Notebook 3, §14), but still containing traces of opposition to hegemonic power. For 
example, when at election time a local candidate promised to provide a tube-well or 
build a road for the Chuknagar Rishi in exchange for votes, they asked instead for a 
small temple, at the centre of their quarters, where their rituals could be celebrated. 
Besides challenging those who drive them “out of the temple”, they were also making 
a statement to all others that, if the divine was in their midst, they too must be 
humans. This choice, well beyond „Sanskritization‟ or against religious ostracism, 
reveals a desire to obtain socio-religious and political visibility, as the following 
example shows: likewise during election time, the big Rishi electorate in Dumuria 
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was divided among three different polling stations, so that they could not unite their 
votes to elect their own candidate, but they nevertheless gained a small majority. 
Again, the Chuknagar Rishi, hired by the caste-Hindus to play for the Durga Puja, 
played their drums throughout the night in celebration of Narajan, one of the lesser 
divinities, always with the intention of showing that they too knew how to be in touch 
with the divine. The last example comes from the successful Rishi community of 
Tala, who have become agriculturalists and are no longer “cow skinners.” They 
refused the invitation of the caste-Hindus to celebrate the Durga together with them, 
and instead did so on their own, spending lavishly and showing great pride.  All these 
„Hindu‟-Rishi groups have put much effort, with the help of missionaries, into the 
education of younger generations.  
After much time spent among these Rishi groups, it became easier to ask them how 
they saw themselves. Initially, in fact, their comments were a reflection of what 
others – caste-Hindus, Muslims, missionaries, police, teachers – would say about 
them. Only later did they feel at ease to let me know what they thought about 
themselves. At times I judged their statements false, until I realised that they were 
projecting a vision of themselves in the future, not just as they were seen by others 
but most of all as they “wanted to be” seen. I was re-reading Heidegger at that point 
and I had in front of me the clearest example of the “futurity of being.” I also 
remembered a passage in Notebook 14, where Gramsci discusses “Pirandello‟s 
Theatre”, introducing there a variation on the question “what is the human being?”: 
“... It seems to me that „one‟s real nature‟ is determined by the struggle to become 
what one wants to become” (Gramsci 1985, 145). 
There are many more examples relating to the history of the Rishi that could be cited 
as a commentary on this “struggle to become what one wants to become”. These 
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examples correspond to the traces left by these “groups without history”, inscribed 
within the histories of colonial powers or in missionary diaries. For instance, in 
response to the Census Reports from 1850 onwards, the Rishi used different names in 
their entries – Chamar, Rishi, Muchi and also Kristan (Christian) – thus confusing the 
officials in charge of logging the census data. The Rishi of Baradal, at the beginning 
of 1900,  refused the invitation of the Calcutta Jesuits to convert to Christianity. 
However, in 1937 they sent a delegation to Calcutta to invite the Jesuits back in order 
to be “protected”  from the police and the many law-suits made against them. They 
had been accused of carrying out “illegal activities” and had been threatened to be 
registered under the Criminal Tribes Act (1871). Later, in 1947, soon after the 
partition of India, these Rishi found themselves in East Pakistan (today Bangladesh) 
and the Belgian Jesuit Fr. Koster helped them carry out their activity as smugglers, 
not to enrich themselves, but to survive. The Jesuits, and others subsequently, 
understood that the “conversion” of the Rishi was a slow process entailing a great 
deal of bargaining and, according to this logic, the Rishi tried to achieve benefits for 
themselves, while negotiating with Catholics, Hindus, Muslims and Protestants (Zene 
2002). 
 
5. From “Untouchables” to Dalits.      
If we  broaden our reflection to include other Dalit groups in Bangladesh, we will 
obtain an even more radical perspective, particularly when taking into account certain 
factors: (1) “Untouchability” should not be part of the ideology of the Islamic 
Republic of Bangladesh. However, neither the Partition of India nor the 
Independence of the country (1971) were sufficient to guarantee equality for Dalits. 
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(2) The Bangladeshi Dalits constitute a substantial minority, and in a more precarious 
position compared to Indian Dalits. (3) Only ten years ago, the word “Dalit” was 
scarcely used by Bangladeshi Untouchables (BDHR – IDSN 2006). This confirms an 
unmistakable emergence of self-awareness among Bangladeshi Dalits and a decisive 
will to make their status as subaltern firstly recognized and then transformed.  
At present, Dalits in Bangladesh are creating networks both at regional and national 
levels and seeking collaboration with international organisations (IIDS – IDSN 2008, 
BDERM, NU and IDSN  2009; AITPN 2009). In 2001 the association Bangladesh 
Dalits’ Human Rights (BDHR) was created, and in 2005 the Network for Socially 
Excluded Communities, thus inaugurating a series of meetings of Dalit organisations 
in the country.  In 2006 the BDHR network organised a consultative meeting, with 
the participation of UN and other international delegates, in order to assess the 
situation of Dalits in Bangladesh, to prepare a detailed proposal on the presence and 
consistency of Dalit groups and the creation of an association of these groups.  
Another suggestion established how Dalits who worked on their own would be free 
to help fellow Dalits. The representatives insisted that Dalits should take upon 
themselves the responsibility of the leadership. This self-awareness made them 
realise it was not enough to gain “small victories”  but they had to have an impact at 
national level. In other words, their interlocutor needed to be the State itself.  The 
sweepers, always considered impure and Untouchables, declared themselves “ready 
for strike-action.”  However, they still needed to solve internal problems regarding 
their Dalit identity: either keeping the old name of Harijan or adopting instead the 
name of Dalit: 
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Naming someone Harijan implies that the person is a „son of God‟ i.e. a 
person without a father (born of a prostitute or sexual worker), whereas 
Dalits means “the oppressed people”. ... [I]t carries more stigmas for people 
to label themselves Harijans. ...  Now there is a conflict because the elderly 
have always identified themselves as Harijans. ( BDHR – IDSN 2006, 21) 
This quote contains many “traces” referring to the precarious internal cohesion of 
Dalits, to the difficulties that await them on the road towards full consciousness of 
their identity and to the ability to implement possible political choices, but it also 
represents the effort to overcome those limitations. The whole endeavour confirms 
that these subaltern groups do experience different degrees of self-consciousness and 
find themselves at different stages, in Gramscian terms, in the process of overcoming 
their subalternity. However, as Spivak recognised, these groups just as other 
subalterns, are exposed to manipulation by unscrupulous „entrepreneurs‟ – the 
“jackals of development” - who see them as exploitable assets on the international 
market.   
 
Conclusion  
The present moment seems to be particularly favourable in the history of Gramscian 
studies. There is no doubt that Gramsci‟s ideas have reached places of prestige as 
well as remote corners of all continents, including South Asia. These reflections have 
been favoured by recent translations of his writings, such as the Prison Notebooks, 
which finally will be available in a complete English edition (Buttigieg 1992; 
Gramsci 1992, 1996, 2007). Moreover, there has been a real osmosis between 
Gramscian studies outside Italy and new reflections within Italy, where the novelty of 
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“Gramsci beyond Gramsci” (Baratta 2007) confronts itself with well-established 
critical-philological studies on the Gramscian lexicon (Frosini e Liguori 2004, 
Liguori e Voza 2009) and on translation and translatability (Boothman 2004, 
Jervolino 2008).  My own efforts also take this direction, as I try to make Gramsci 
“readable” and translatable for the Dalits of South Asia, about whom he too, in his 
own way, had already spoken.  
Many of the authors quoted here suggest ways to recover and put to good use a 
Gramscian methodology that recognises the presence of the subaltern in new contexts 
and at times different from those analysed by Gramsci himself. Our task will be to 
recover those “traces” present in the fragmented history of these groups so as to 
detect the vital elements that will assist them in overcoming their subalternity. Today, 
more than ever, the Dalits of South Asia are able to express their resistance to 
oppression through media to which in the past they had no access. To the renowned 
creativity of the Dalits who express their experience through singing, music, poetry, 
dance and the “beating of drums” (Clarke 2000), a great number of new reflections 
and publications have now been added, both in the shape of detailed monographs 
discussing Dalits‟ experiences (Charslay and Karnath eds. 1998, Shah ed. 2001, 
Gorringe 2004, Narayan 2006), and more general studies (Bhatt 2005, Chatterjee 
2004, Das 2004, Jenkins 2003, Yagati 2003, Anand ed. 2005, Yadav ed. 2002, Shah 
ed. 2002, Webster 2007) addressed to current topics in the processes and 
developments of contemporary Dalit movements (Hardtmann 2009). These efforts 
are consolidated by the use of the internet by concerned scholars as well as by Dalits 
themselves who find it a valuable means to convey their ideas and programmes of 
action (web.seminar  2001, 2006).  
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During the past few years a major change has been taking place: the emphasis seems 
to have shifted from Dalits‟ mere awareness of their “oppression”, towards the 
mobilisation of consciousness as a “transforming agent” of subalternity, and hence 
towards a new path taking them from “desperate cries” to liberating action. This new 
line of thought, in addition to regaining the historic figures of the “Dalit question” – 
such as Jotirao Pule, Valangkar, Periyar, and Ambedkar (Chatterjee 2004)– addresses 
the formation of methodological concepts which, by revealing the many spheres in 
which subalternity is present, offer feasible solutions to overcome it.  
A few months before his death in 1956, in a last desperate attempt to recover his 
humanity, the Dalit leader Ambedkar (Zelliot 2004) converted to Buddhism, along 
with a large number of “Untouchable” Mahars. Prior to this, in 1927, Ambedkar, 
together with his followers, publicly burned copies of Manusmirti, and in 1930, while 
prompting them to enter Hindu temples, he exhorted them with these words: 
It is not true that entry into Hindu temples will solve your whole problem. Our 
problem is very broad. It extends into the political, social, religious and 
economic spheres. Today‟s satyagraha is a challenge to the Hindu mind. From 
this true satyagraha we shall see whether Hindu society is ready to treat us as 
human beings. 
8
   
For many countries in South Asia, the existing presence of subaltern groups, 
particularly of Dalits, reveals a certain failure of the “democratic State.” The situation 
of Dalits in contemporary India, defined as the “most populous democracy in the 
world”, invites us to think critically and rigorously about those categories so 
intertwined with the grasp of “subalternity”: state, civil society and hegemony. All 
this prompts us to consider how, for Gramsci, “hegemony and civil society remit to 
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unequal power relations” and that Gramsci “highlights the limits of modern 
democracy” (Buttigieg 1998, 55). 
At this point the question – the Gramscian question – returns to mind as significant as 
ever, open and still unanswered: “Which conclusions could an analysis of civil 
society reach, when accomplished today in a Gramscian style – hence an analysis 
which is critical, concrete, specific, and from the point of view of the subaltern?” 
(Buttigieg 1998, 62). Or, from the point of view of our reflection: “... if, indeed, the 
Dalit is an inaugural political subject, then how is it possible to write an account of 
India‟s [and South Asia‟s] political modernity without engaging with the problem of 
Dalit freedom and emancipation?” (Rao 2008, 25).  
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1  Spivak affirms that: “ … I was just beginning to read the Subaltern Studies then and I 
was therefore dependent upon that group‟s reading of Gramsci‟s notion of the 
subaltern. In my essay I made it clear that I was talking about the space as defined by 
Ranajit Guha ...” (Spivak 1993, 288). However, she never felt the need to return to 
Gramsci: “I think the word „subaltern‟ is losing its definitive power ...” (ibid. 290).    
2
  Spivak refers to the subtle distinction between “to speak”  and “to talk” , according 
to which “... within the definition of subalternity as such there is a certain not-being-
able-to-make-speech acts that is implicit …” (1993, 290-91).  
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3
  The authors of Subaltern Studies have often uncritically adopted the position of 
Louis Dumont (1970) with regard to the interpretation of the caste system.     
4
      See “Feminist Narratives of Indian Left”, 
http://readerswords.wordpress.com/2008/04/14/feminist-naratives-of-indian-left/  
5
  “It may remain a practical impossibility to organise Untouchables as a single, all-
India, political force, but as a whole Dalits are now more committed than ever before 
to what they increasingly recognise as their common struggle …” (Mendelsohn & 
Vicziany 1998, 1).  
6
  “We argue that, for Gramsci, fragmentation of any social group‟s „common sense‟, 
worldview and language is a political detriment, impeding effective political 
organisation to counter exploitation but that such fragmentation cannot be overcome 
by the imposition of a 'rational' or 'logical' worldview. Instead, what is required is a 
deep engagement with the fragments that make up subaltern historical, social, 
economic and political conditions” (Green and Ives 2009, 3). 
7
  The (Muchi)-Rishi of Bengal and Bangladesh are leather-workers, skinners, and 
musicians by trade and share the fate of the Chamars present all over  the Indian 
Subcontinent  (Zene 2002).  
8
  From the speech of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, 2 March, 1930, at the Kala Ram Mandir, in 
Nashik (Maharashtra), in the presence of 15,000 Dalits.  
